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Abstract 
The current work tests whether the dispositional tendency to compare oneself to others—Social 
Comparison Orientation (SCO)—impacts decision in moral dilemmas. Past research offers two 
competing predictions for how SCO impacts moral decision-making: a) SCO increases 
deontological judgments because people high in SCO care especially about social norms versus 
b) SCO decreases deontological judgments because people high in SCO are competitive and thus 
unconcerned about causing harm to others. Four studies (two preregistered) find consistent 
support that SCO decreases deontological decision. This relationship was robust to employing 
conventional (Study 1) and process dissociation (Studies 2-4) dilemma analytic techniques. 
Furthermore, we find that psychopathy uniquely mediates decreased deontological decision 
among people high in SCO (Study 4). These results indicate that high-SCO people make fewer 
deontological decisions because they are less concerned with causing harm. Overall, the current 
research suggests there is a dark side to making social comparisons.  
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How do people decide what is morally right or wrong? Philosophy and early moral 
psychology often assumed that people arrive at moral decisions mainly through private internal 
processing—either through reasoning, intuition, or emotional reactions. However, recent theories 
acknowledge that moral situations and judgments are often inherently social (e.g., Gray, Waytz, 
& Young, 2012; Greene, 2014; Haidt, 2001, 2003; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Kohlberg, 1969; 
Nichols & Mallon, 2006; Pizarro, 2000; Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2012). This holds true for 
sacrificial dilemma judgments where causing harm maximizes overall outcomes: When people 
make dilemma decisions, the presence of others—real or imagined—impacts those decisions 
(Bostyn & Roets, 2017; Kundu & Cummins, 2013; Rom & Conway, 2018).  
Building off the social nature of moral decisions, the current research explores how the 
chronic tendency to compare oneself to others influences dilemma decisions. Specifically, we 
focus on interpersonal differences in Social Comparison Orientation (SCO; Gibbons & Buunk, 
1999): a well-established measure of the tendency to frequently engage in social comparisons 
(Festinger, 1954; for a recent overview, see Gerber, Wheeler, & Suls, 2018). Although SCO 
consists of two factors—comparisons of abilities and of opinions—they are highly related, so we 
follow the tradition of treating SCO as a unitary construct (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). We 
considered two contrasting hypotheses: that people high in SCO refuse sacrificial harm more 
often versus less often than those low in SCO. Before unpacking these hypotheses below, we 
discuss moral dilemmas and process dissociation analyses.  
Moral Dilemmas and Disentangling Deontological from Utilitarian Responses 
We test how SCO affects sacrificial dilemma decisions where causing harm maximizes 
overall outcomes. The most famous example is the trolley dilemma where a trolley will kill five 
people unless the protagonist pulls a switch to move the trolley onto another track, killing one 
person instead (Foot, 1967). Each decision aligns with a philosophical position (even though the 
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lay psychology leading to such judgments involves processes very different from those discussed 
in philosophy, Conway, Goldstein-Greenwood, Polacek, & Greene, 2018; Kahane et al., 2018; 
Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, & Savulescu, 2015). Pulling the switch is consistent with 
deontological ethics that prohibit causing harm (Kant, 1785/1959); pulling the switch is 
consistent with utilitarian ethics that require maximizing outcomes (even if doing so involves 
causing harm, (Mill, 1861/1998).1  
Conventional dilemma analyses treat deontological and utilitarian decisions as opposite 
ends of a single bipolar dimension, an approach we employ in Study 1. However, using dilemmas 
where causing harm fails to maximize outcomes allows researchers to disentangle refusal to 
cause harm (upholding deontology) from concern for outcomes (upholding utilitarianism), a 
technique called process dissociation (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Sacrificing one to save five 
may reflect reduced harm-rejection, increased outcome-maximization, both, or a more complex 
pattern such as an increase in harm-rejection coupled with an even larger increase in outcome-
maximization. We employed process dissociation to clarify how SCO influences dilemma 
decisions in Studies 2-4. 
Social Comparison Orientation and Moral Dilemmas 
Research on responses to sacrificial dilemmas can be divided into two streams. The 
original stream examined basic psychological processes involved in dilemma responding. The 
most notable work described a dual-process model where rejecting sacrificial harm primarily 
reflects affective reactions to harm, whereas accepting sacrificial harm primarily reflects 
cognitive evaluations of outcomes (e.g., Greene, 2007). Considerable work supports this basic 
 
1 Some research examines additional deontological concerns not examined here (Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, 
Friesdorf, & Hütter, 2017), and sacrificial dilemma decisions fail to truly match utilitarian ideals because they assess 
only the belief that sacrificial harm is acceptable rather than mandatory (Kahane et al., 2018; Royzman, Landy, & 
Leeman, 2015). Thus, dilemmas do not capture the essence of philosophical thinking. Nonetheless, dilemma 
responses descriptively match the ideals of each philosophy; we thus employ these terms descriptively (Conway et 
al., 2018).  
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distinction, although there is also more complexity than originally theorized (Byrd & Conway, 
2019; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Körner & Volk, 2014; Reynolds & Conway, 2018).  
A second stream of work examines how social influences shape dilemma judgments. Such 
work shows that dilemma responses also reflect social pressure, reputational concerns, and self-
presentation (Bostyn & Roets, 2017; Kundu & Cummins, 2013; Monin, 2007; Rom & Conway, 
2018). Notably, these studies suggest that decision-makers who reject sacrificial harm correctly 
expect others to view them as warmer, more moral, and more trustworthy, albeit less competent 
(Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett, 2016; Rom, Weiss, & Conway, 2017)—hence social pressure 
favors deontological decisions (Bostyn & Roets, 2017; Reynolds, Knighten, & Conway, 2019).  
Given the role of both social pressure and emotion in favoring deontological decisions 
independent of utilitarian decisions (e.g. Bostyn & Roets, 2017; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; 
Reynolds et al., 2019), SCO may be associated with increased deontological decision-making. 
People engage in social comparison partly to gain a more accurate view of social reality 
(Festinger, 1954). Therefore, high SCO people seek more information relating others to the self 
(Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; Schneider & Schupp, 2014; Van der Zee, Oldersma, Buunk, & Bos, 
1998). Given that high-SCO people place greater weight on normative information and social 
pressure, they may prefer to reject sacrificial harm, upholding deontological ethics. Moreover, 
high SCO-people tend to attend carefully to their feelings and emotions (Gibbons & Buunk, 
1999), so they may experience greater emotional aversion to causing sacrificial harm (Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013; Reynolds & Conway, 2018). Note that such theories remain silent regarding 
utilitarian decisions, which do not appear associated with processes that characterize SCO, such 
as reputational concerns or emotional processing. Hence, this perspective suggests that SCO will 
uniquely predict increased deontological responding.  
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However, the opposite prediction is also likely: that SCO will predict reduced 
deontological responding. This prediction follows from research suggesting that SCO involves 
reduced concern for others. For example, people high in SCO tend to experience stronger 
malicious envy and narcissistic rivalry, aggressively devaluing others (Bogart, Benotsch, & 
Pavlovic, 2004; Lange, Crusius, & Hagemeyer, 2016; Rentzsch & Gross, 2015; Zeelenberg & 
Pieters, 2007). Additionally, high-SCO people often react with anger towards others, and desire 
others to experience worse outcomes than themselves (Bogaerts & Pandelaere, 2013; Neff & 
Vonk, 2009). Importantly, reduced emotional concern for others is usually associated with 
reduced deontological responses, but not utilitarian decisions, when calculated independently via 
process dissociation (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Conway et al., 2018; Gleichgerrcht & Young, 
2013; Patil & Silani, 2014; Reynolds & Conway, 2018; Royzman et al., 2015). For example, 
antisocial or ‘dark’ personality traits, including psychopathy, are also associated with reduced 
deontological decision-making, and are either unrelated or even negatively related to utilitarian 
decision-making using PD (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Conway et al., 2018; Djeriouat & 
Trémolière, 2014; Reynolds & Conway, 2018). Hence, this perspective suggests that SCO will 
uniquely predict reduced deontological responding.  
Again, such theories are largely silent regarding predictions of how SCO will relate to 
utilitarian responding, considering that dark personality traits are often unrelated to utilitarian 
responses. Nonetheless, we considered the possibility that high-SCO people may focus on 
emotions at the expense of careful deliberation (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). Past work shows that 
heuristically focusing on rules or on ‘gut-feeling’ sentimental processing reduces utilitarian 
decisions, but is unrelated to deontological ones (Conway, Velasquez, Reynolds, Forstmann, & 
Love, 2020; Fleischmann, Lammers, Conway, & Galinsky, 2019). Hence, SCO may indirectly 
reduce utilitarian decision-making through increased endorsement of heuristic and sentimental 
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processing. Conversely, some research suggests that high-SCO people tend to engage in 
increased deliberation—such as seeking information about others (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; 
Schneider & Schupp, 2014; Van der Zee et al., 1998) and comparing between options (Bosch, 
Buunk, Siero, & Park, 2010). Careful cognitive processing tends to primarily increase utilitarian 
(but not deontological) responding (Bartels, 2008; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Patil et al., 
2020). Hence, SCO may indirectly predict increased utilitarian responding through increased 
Cognitive Reflection (Frederick, 2005). If so, these effects should partially cancel out, or show 
mathematical suppression, for the effect of SCO on utilitarian responses. Therefore, we 
anticipated that any links between SCO and utilitarian responding would be weaker than between 
SCO and deontological responding.  
The Current Research 
Across four studies, we tested opposing theoretically-derived predictions suggesting that 
SCO predicts increased versus decreased deontological decision-making. We also examined 
exploratory hypotheses regarding how SCO predicts utilitarian responding. Study 1 tests how 
SCO affects participants’ responses to conventional moral dilemmas that treat deontological and 
utilitarian responses as opposites. Studies 2 and 3 employed process dissociation to disentangle 
the relationship between SCO and deontological and utilitarian patterns independently. Finally, 
Study 4 tested multiple possible mediators to clarify the processes involved.  
In the online supplementary material (OSM), we report the results of three studies 
experimentally manipulating social comparisons (N = 835). We examined whether 
experimentally inducing people to compare their abilities or opinions (Study 5) or to make 
general comparisons (Studies 6 and 7) impacts dilemma decisions. Significant effects on a 
manipulation check and increased competitiveness in the comparison condition suggested that 
our manipulations were successful. However, this comparison mindset manipulation did not have 
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an effect in any of the experiments, nor in a meta-analysis2 across the experiments: deontological 
decisions, β = .063, SE = 0.071, p = .373, CI95 [-.076, .202], utilitarian decisions, β = -.080, SE = 
0.071, p = .261, CI95 [-.218, .059]. These results suggest that merely engaging in comparisons 
does not seem to influence decisions in moral dilemmas. Instead, the personality trait of SCO—a 
chronic orientation towards comparing—and its link to psychopathy is what seems to produce a 
decrease in deontological decisions. We return to these findings in the Discussion. 
We also report an internal meta-analysis to improve effect size estimates. We report all 
studies here; there is no file drawer. We treated SCO as a unitary construct (see OSM for 
secondary analyses on separate SCO subscales). We report how we determined sample size, all 
data exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and all measures in the study. Data for all studies are 
available here: osf.io/2e9aq/?view_only=a3f7c2a93ec944abb52d0bb4d8654996. 
Study 1 – Conventional Dilemma Analyses 
Study 1 tested how SCO relates to conventional sacrificial dilemmas decisions. We 
preregistered this study at aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=jz8h2p. 
Method 
Participants. Two-hundred-and-fifty-two American MTurkers (115 female, 136 male, 1 
other, Mage=35) participated for $1.20. Sample size was a priori set to 250 following Schönbrodt 
and Perugini (2013). Procedure. Participants completed the 11-item SCO scale (Gibbons & 
Buunk, 1999) on scales from 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree), Cronbach’s α=.92. 
Example items include “I often compare myself with others with respect to what I have 
accomplished in life” and “I always like to know what others in a similar situation would do”. 
Next, participants reported whether they would perform harmful actions that maximize outcomes 
 
2 For Study 5a, we compared two social comparison conditions against the control condition. For Study 5c, we 
calculated the basic effect for all participants, rather than just those high in SCO. 
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in fourteen moral dilemmas used by Bartels (2008) between 1(No, most deontological) and 4(Yes, 
most utilitarian). For example, one dilemma involved killing one injured submarine crew 
member to preserve air to save six other crew members. Another involved throwing one person 
off a life raft to save the other six people from sinking. Finally, participants completed 
demographics. 
Results  
 As predicted, high-SCO people tended to accept outcome-maximizing harm, inconsistent 
with deontological ideals and consistent with utilitarian ideals, r(250)=.220, p<.001, CI95[.099, 
.334].  
Study 2 – Process Dissociation 
 Although Study 1 provided first evidence that high-SCO people prefer utilitarian over 
deontological responses, it remains unclear whether this pattern reflects increased utilitarian 
concerns, decreased deontological concerns, or another pattern. Therefore, we replicated Study 1 
employing process dissociation to independently estimate deontological and utilitarian 
inclinations (Conway & Gawronski, 2013).  
Method 
Participants. Two-hundred-and-fifty-two English native speakers from Prolific 
Academic (112 female, 140 male, Mage=35) participated for £1.00. No participants indicated 
inattentive responding. Due to other research questions explored elsewhere, this sample contained 
only participants with supervisory duties at work3. We again set sample size to 250 a priori.  
Procedure. As part of a larger battery of measures (see OSM), participants answered 
work-related questions, before completing the six-item short version of the SCO scale (Schneider 
 
3 This sample included only people with supervisory work duties, who may feel particularly powerful, thereby 
impacting dilemma decisions (Lammers & Stapel, 2009; Lucas & Galinsky), but some research suggests no direct 
relationship between power and utilitarian or deontological decisions due to suppression (Fleischmann et al. 2019).  
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& Schupp, 2014), on a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree), Cronbach’s α=.85, 
two personality questionnaires (see OSM), the 20-item Conway and Gawronski (2013) dilemma 
battery in a randomized order (see OSM; see also Friesdorf, Conway, & Gawronski, 2015 for a 
meta-analysis), demographics, and an attention check. The dilemma battery includes ten moral 
dilemmas each with one incongruent and one congruent version. Incongruent dilemmas involve 
causing harm that maximizes outcome, so deontological and utilitarian responses oppose one 
another, as in conventional dilemmas. Congruent dilemmas employ parallel wording, except that 
causing harm no longer clearly maximizes outcomes, so deontological and utilitarian responses 
align. For example, one dilemma involves killing a baby to save hiding townspeople from being 
killed (incongruent version) or forced into hard labor (congruent version).  
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Table 1 
Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations of Social Comparison Orientation (SCO), 
Conventional Utilitarian versus Deontological Judgments, and Standardized Deontological and 
Utilitarian Process Dissociation (PD) Parameters, Study 2 (Top), Study 3 (Bottom). 
Variable 1 2 3 4 M SD 





.144* – -.704*** .676*** 0.60 0.18 
3. Deontological 
PD Parameter 
-.106 -.624*** – .007 0.00 1.00 
4. Utilitarian PD 
parameter 
.062 .649** .139* – 0.00 1.00 
M 3.33 0.58 0.00 0.00 – – 
SD 0.78 0.18 1.00 1.00 – – 
Note. Values above the diagonal and vertical M and SD are from Study 2, values below the 
diagonal and horizontal M and SD are from Study 3 (replication).  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Results 
 First, we examined the conventional analysis (incongruent dilemmas only). Replicating 
Study 1, high-SCO people tended to accept outcome-maximizing harm, r(250)=.165, p=.009, 
CI95[.042, .283] (see Table 1 top). However, process dissociation clarified this pattern: high-SCO 
people scored lower on the deontology parameter, r(250)=-.238, p<.001, CI95[-.351, -.118], but 
not higher on the utilitarian parameter, r(250)=.006, p=.930, CI95[-.118, .129]. These two 
correlations differed significantly, z=-2.785, p=.005. Thus, SCO predicted reduced concerns 
about causing harm but not increased concerns about maximizing outcomes.  
Study 3 – Replication 
Study 2 replicated and clarified Study 1 using process dissociation, but the sample was 
restricted to supervisors and we only employed the short SCO scale. Study 3 addresses these 
limitations.  
Method 
Participants. Two-hundred-and-fifty-two American MTurkers participated for $0.60. We 
again a priori set sample size to 250, but removed four inattentive participants and one whose 
parameters calculations included impossible division by zero, bringing our final sample to N=247 
(126 female, 121 male, Mage=37). 
Procedure. Participants completed the SCO scale from Study 1 (Gibbons & Buunk, 
1999), Cronbach’s α=.90, the sense of power scale (for unrelated research, Anderson & Galinsky, 
2006), the process dissociation moral dilemma battery (Conway & Gawronski, 2013), 
demographics, and an attention check.  
Results 
Again, the conventional analysis replicated Studies 1 and 2: SCO correlated with 
increased utilitarianism/reduced deontology, r(245)=.144, p=.024, CI95[.020, 0.264] (see Table 1 
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bottom). The process dissociation analysis largely replicated Study 2: High-SCO people scored 
lower than low-SCO people on the deontology parameter, albeit marginally r(245)=-.106, 
p=.097, CI95[-.228, .019], whereas SCO did not correlate with the utilitarian parameter, 
r(245)=.062, p=.328, CI95[-.063, .185]. The two correlations differed marginally, z=-1.90, 
p=.057.  
Study 4 – Mediation 
Studies 2 and 3 demonstrate that high-SCO people show reduced deontological moral 
decision-making. Study 4 aimed to replicate this effect and test underlying processes. We use a 
multiple mediation design to simultaneously test four plausible mediators derived from theory 
(see Fiedler, Harris, & Schott, 2018). We theorized that high-SCO reduces deontological thinking 
because it reduces emotional concern for others. To test this mediation path, we measured 
differences in empathic concern and non-clinical psychopathy, a socially aversive personality 
trait associated with a callous disregard for others (Jones & Paulhus, 2014). Empathic concern 
predicts increased deontological responses, and psychopathy predicts reduced deontological 
responses (e.g., Conway et al., 2018; Reynolds & Conway, 2018). We also tested two other 
mediators we did not expect to be significant (see below).  
Although SCO was not significantly related to the utilitarian parameter in Studies 1-3, it 
remains possible that it does so indirectly via indirect effects in opposite directions that suppress 
one another (see Fleischmann et al., 2019). Therefore, consistent with our predictions and the 
dual-process model linking utilitarian judgments to cognitive deliberation (Greene, 2007; Greene, 
Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004), we examined analytic thinking style (a tendency to 
reflect over one’s decisions; Frederick, 2005; Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016) 
and rule adherence (a tendency to heuristically and dogmatically adhere to moral rules in lieu of 
careful deliberation; Conway et al., 2020). People high in SCO search for comparative 
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information (e.g., Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; Schneider & Schupp, 2014), suggesting they might 
score higher on analytical thinking and lower on rule adherence. If so, these indirect effects may 
suppress one another, as analytic thinking increases utilitarian responses (Li, Xia, Wu, & Chen, 
2018; McPhetres, Conway, Hughes, & Zuckerman, 2018; Patil et al., 2020; Paxton, Ungar, & 
Greene, 2012), whereas rule adherence reduces utilitarian responses (Fleischmann et al., 2019; 
Piazza & Landy, 2013). We preregistered this study at aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=77sm4d. 
Method 
Participants. Considering the meta-analytic correlation between SCO and deontological 
decisions from Studies 2 and 3, r=-.174, a sample size of 340 would provide ~90% power. We 
slightly oversampled: 345 American MTurkers participated for $1.20. We removed seven who 
reported inattention, bringing our final sample to 338 (148 female, 189 male, 1 other, Mage=35). 
Procedure. Participants answered the 11-item SCO scale (Cronbach’s α=.91) and four 
potential mediators: the seven-item empathic concern scale (Davis, 1980), Cronbach’s α=.90, the 
nine-item Psychopathy Scale of the Short Dark Triad (Jones & Paulhus, 2014), Cronbach’s 
α=.84, and the seven-item rule orientation subscale of the moral orientation scale (Conway et al., 
2020; Fleischmann et al., 2019), Cronbach’s α=.88, each on 7-point scales. Participants also 
completed the three-question Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005), Cronbach’s 
α=.76, scored as correct (1), incorrect (0) (averaged), the dilemma battery from Studies 2 and 3, 
demographics, and an attention check. 
Results 
Correlational analysis. Once again, conventional analyses showed that high-SCO people 
answered dilemmas tended to accept sacrificial harm, r(336)=.113, p=.038, CI95[.006, .217], (see 
Table 2), but process dissociation clarified that high-SCO people made fewer deontological 
decisions, r(336)=-.108, p=.047, CI95[-.212, -0.001], not more utilitarian decisions, r(336)=-.009, 
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p=.869, CI95[-0.116, 0.098], although these correlations did not differ significantly, z=-1.48, 
p=.139. 
Mediation: SCO to Deontology. Next, we tested whether four potential mediators 
simultaneously carried significant indirect variance between SCO and deontological decisions via 
the Process macro (Model 4, 10.000 bootstrapping samples, Hayes, 2013). Including mediators 
reduced the direct effect to non-significance (see Figure 1, Table 3). As predicted, psychopathy 
significantly mediated the relationship between SCO and reduced deontological decisions, 
b=-.047, CI95[-0.082, -0.018]. No other mediator was significant. As predicted, people high in 
empathic concern made more deontological decisions, but SCO did not predict empathic concern. 
Contrary to predictions, high-SCO people scored higher on rule orientation and lower on the 
CRT, but neither were significantly related to deontological decisions. Together, these results 
suggest that high-SCO people tend to make fewer deontological decisions due to emotional 
callousness associated with psychopathy.  
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Figure 1. Multiple mediation model showing the relationship between social comparison 
orientation (SCO) and reduced deontological decision-making is mediated by psychopathy, but 
not empathic concern, rule orientation, or CRT scores. Bold lines indicate significant effects 
and dotted lines indicate nonsignificant effects. Significant indirect effects in black, non-





Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations of Social Comparison Orientation (SCO), Mediators, and Deontological and Utilitarian 
Process Dissociation (PD) Parameters in Study 4 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. SCO – .173** .021 .283*** -.171** .113* -.108* -.009 
2. Psychopathy  – -.395** .137 -.174** .175** -.436*** -.295*** 
3. Empathic concern   – -.007 .040 -.114* .314*** .173** 
4. Rule orientation    – -.258*** -.013 -.148** -.242*** 





     – -.640*** .536*** 
7. Deontological PD 
Parameter 
     
 
– .244*** 
8. Utilitarian PD 
Parameter  
     
 
 – 
M 4.28 2.51 5.16 4.17 0.57 0.57 0.00 0.00 
SD 1.25 1.13 1.31 1.27 0.41 0.21 1.00 1.00 





Mediation Model for the Relationship between SCO and Deontology by Psychopathy, 
Empathic Concern, Rule Orientation, and CRT in Study 4 
Path b SE p 95% CI 
Total effect -0.086 0.043 .047 [-0.172, -0.001] 
Direct effect -0.015 0.041 .714 [-0.095, 0.065] 
SCO to Mediators     
Psychopathy 0.156 0.049 .001 [0.061, 0.252] 
Empathic concern 0.022 0.057 .696 [-0.090, 0.134] 
Rule Orientation 0.289 0.053 <.001 [0.184, 0.393] 
CRT -0.056 0.017 .002 [-0.090, -0.021] 
Mediators to Deontology     
Psychopathy -0.300 0.048 <.001 [-0.394, -0.206] 
Empathic concern 0.135 0.040 .001 [0.056, 0.215] 
Rule Orientation -0.060 0.041 .143 [-0.139, 0.020] 
CRT 0.186 0.125 .137 [-0.059, 0.431] 
Indirect effects through     
Psychopathy -0.047 0.016  [-0.082, -0.018] 
Empathic concern 0.003 0.010  [-0.016, 0.025] 
Rule Orientation -0.017 0.014  [-0.044, 0.013] 
CRT -0.010 0.008  [-0.027, 0.003] 
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Exploratory Mediation Analysis: SCO to Utilitarianism. To examine possible 
suppression, we ran an identical mediation model on utilitarian decisions (see Figure 2, see Table 
S1 in OSM). Although there was no direct effect of SCO on utilitarian decision-making, 
b=-0.007, SE=0.044, p=.869, CI95[-0.093, 0.079], upon adding mediators we found a significant 
direct effect, b=0.093, SE=0.042, p=.028, CI95[0.010, 0.177], as well as evidence of suppression. 
Specifically, SCO was associated with higher psychopathy, stronger rule adherence, and lower 
CRT scores, each of which reduced utilitarian responding: psychopathy, b=-0.031, 
CI95[-0.062, -0.012], rule adherence, b=-0.044, CI95[-0.086, -0.017], CRT scores, b=-0.027, 
CI95[-0.052, -0.010]. These results suggest that high-SCO people might score higher in utilitarian 
responses, except that they also score higher on psychopathy, rule adherence, and lower in 
analytical thinking. 
 
Figure 2. Multiple mediation model of the relationship of social comparison orientation (SCO) 
and utilitarian decisions. The effect of SCO on utilitarian decisions is suppressed by negative 
indirect effects through psychopathy, rule orientation, and CRT scores. Bold lines indicate 
significant effects and dotted lines indicate nonsignificant effects. Significant indirect effects in 
black, nonsignificant in gray. Total effect of SCO on utilitarianism = -0.007, p = .869. 
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Meta-Analysis 
To increase precision (e.g., Cumming, 2014), and because effects were not always 
significant, we computed three meta-analyses using the metafor package in R (R Core Team, 
2017; Viechtbauer, 2010) on conventional analyses and each PD parameter. We included all 
studies in our lab and employed the same analyses for all studies (Vosgerau, Simonsohn, Nelson, 
& Simmons, 2018). As predicted, the meta-analysis on conventional dilemma analyses found that 
high-SCO people tended to accept sacrificial harm, consistent with utilitarian ethics and 
inconsistent with deontological ethics, β=.158, SE=0.030, p<.001, CI95[.100, .216] (see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Forest plot of meta-analysis of relationship between social comparison orientation 
and conventional dilemma decisions showing that social comparison orientation predicts either 
increased utilitarian or decreased deontological responses.  
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A meta-analysis of each process dissociation parameter4 (Studies 2-4) clarified that high-
SCO people made significantly fewer deontological decisions, β=-.148, SE=0.034, p<.001, 
CI95[-.214, -.082], but not utilitarian decisions, β=.011, SE=0.034, p=.759, CI95[-.057, .078], see 
Figure 4. The two coefficients differed significantly, β=.159, SE=0.046, p<.001, CI95[.070, .249], 
indicating that high-SCO people accepted sacrificial harm on conventional dilemmas because 
they have weaker aversion to causing harm, not stronger motivation to maximize outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 4. Forest plot of meta-analysis of relationship between social comparison orientation 
and the deontological and utilitarian process dissociation parameters showing that social 
comparison orientation predicts decreased deontological but not increased utilitarian responses. 
 
 
4 To compare correlations, we used a moderator in a multivariate maximum likelihood (MML) random-effects model 
to account for statistical dependency. We calculated the covariances of the correlations according to Olkin and Finn 
(1990), and specified random effects for the moderator (D versus U process dissociation parameter). We conducted 
the same model for multiple endpoints to estimate the deontological and utilitarian parameter. For full analyses see 
osf.io/2e9aq/?view_only=a3f7c2a93ec944abb52d0bb4d8654996. 
COMPARISONS AND DEONTOLOGICAL DECISIONS 22 
General Discussion 
Across four studies, we found consistent evidence that people high in social comparison 
orientation (SCO), i.e., people who habitually compare themselves with others, tend to make 
different sacrificial dilemma decisions than people who compare less often. High-SCO people 
tended to accept sacrificial harm, consistent with utilitarianism, on conventional analyses that 
treat harm-rejection and outcome-maximization responses as opposites (Studies 1-4). However, 
process dissociation analyses (Studies 2-4) clarified that this finding obtained because high-SCO 
people make fewer decisions to reject sacrificial harm (deontological judgments), but do not 
differ from low-SCO people in the tendency to maximize outcomes (utilitarian judgments). Our 
fourth study identified a key mechanism: high-SCO people tend to have a more callous 
interpersonal orientation, scoring higher on non-clinical psychopathy, which facilitated allowing 
harmful action. SCO did not have a significant direct effect on utilitarian responding, but Study 4 
suggested that this null effect is due to multiple mediators suppressing one another.  
Theoretical Implications 
The conclusion that SCO entails reduced harm-rejection is striking considering previous 
research showing that people high in SCO are rather interpersonally oriented, insecure, and tend 
to self-monitor (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; Neff & Vonk, 2009; Soibel, Fong, Mullin, Jenkins, & 
Mar, 2012). From such work, one might predict high-SCO people would be more likely to bolster 
self-presentation by increasing deontological decision-making (Rom & Conway, 2018). Yet, we 
find no evidence of such self-presentation tendencies among high-SCO people. Instead, people 
high in SCO make fewer deontological decisions, and do not differ in utilitarian decisions, 
suggests they are overall less concerned about morality and how moral they appear. A similar 
pattern emerges for people high in egoism, selfishness, and willingness to commit ethical 
violations (Conway et al., 2018). This finding was mediated by psychopathy, which predicts 
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many immoral decisions beyond dilemmas (Glenn, Iyer, Graham, Koleva, & Haidt, 2009; Pletti, 
Lotto, Buodo, & Sarlo, 2017). Hence, our findings suggest that SCO reflects a ruthless, selfish 
concern for proving one is better than others, which involves decreased emotional concern for the 
well-being of others. Consistent with this argument, recent research finds that high-SCO people 
are more competitive and angrier towards others; they also are more envious, and narcissistic 
(Bogaerts & Pandelaere, 2013; Bogart et al., 2004; Lange et al., 2016; Neff & Vonk, 2009; 
Rentzsch & Gross, 2015).  
The finding that psychopathy mediates the relation between SCO and reduced 
deontological decisions also sheds light on the puzzling positive relationship of utilitarianism and 
psychopathy using conventional dilemmas (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Gao & Tang, 2013; Patil, 
2015; Pletti et al., 2017). Our results support that psychopathy is not, in fact, related to increased 
utilitarian judgments, but rather to decreased deontological ones (see also Conway et al., 2018; 
Reynolds & Conway, 2018). Thus, criticisms of dilemmas pointing to supposedly higher 
utilitarian responding among antisocial people reflect methodological rather than conceptual 
concerns (Kahane et al., 2015). 
Studies 2 and 3 suggested that there is no direct relationship between SCO and 
utilitarianism, but Study 4 revealed some additional nuance. Specifically, the results showed that 
high-SCO people showed increased utilitarian thinking—consistent with their tendency to 
compare and deliberate—but this relationship was suppressed by other characteristics that 
distinguish them from low-SCO people. Specifically, high-SCO people scored higher on 
psychopathy and rule adherence, which reduced utilitarian responding, but lower in analytic 
thinking, which increased utilitarian responding, replicating previous studies (Bartels, 2008; 
Fleischmann et al., 2019; Gawronski et al., 2017; Li et al., 2018; McPhetres et al., 2018; Patil et 
al., 2020; Paxton et al., 2012). Hence, these studies reveal suppression effects, which suggest 
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complexity in the SCO-utilitarian relationship. However, these findings are based on exploratory 
analyses, so future research should replicate these results to increase confidence. 
Some research suggests that following moral rules leads to increased deontological 
decisions, whereas analytical processing leads to increased utilitarian decisions (Bartels, 2008; 
Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008; Nichols & Mallon, 2006; Patil et al., 2020; Paxton et al., 2012; 
Piazza & Landy, 2013). Yet, Study 4 showed that rule adherence is associated with decreased 
deontological decisions and analytic thinking style is associated with increased deontological 
decisions, although both are associated more strongly with reduced utilitarian decisions. 
Although seemingly counter-intuitive, these findings actually corroborate an emerging line of 
research demonstrating that people who endorse adhering to moral rules are not more 
deontological, but rather appear to be less utilitarian (Conway et al., 2020; Fleischmann et al., 
2019; Maranges, Reynolds, Baumeister, & Conway, 2019). Similarly, recent research documents 
that cognitive deliberation sometimes increase deontological as well as utilitarian responses in 
dilemmas (Byrd & Conway, 2019; Gamez-Djokic & Molden, 2016; Gawronski et al., 2017; 
McPhetres et al., 2018). Thus, despite appearing counter-intuitive, both results align with current 
findings in the field. Furthermore, research linking rule adherence and analytic thinking to 
dilemma decisions has typically employed conventional analyses, treating deontological and 
utilitarian decisions as opposites. It is possible previous studies are consistent with our findings, 
as the stronger association of both variables with utilitarianism could explain previous results.  
Strengths and Limitations 
One interesting aspect of our research is that our correlational results and our 
experimental results were not consistent. In our correlational studies, we find that the personality 
trait of SCO is related to decreased deontological decisions in moral dilemmas. This association 
emerged consistently in conventional dilemma analyses, was significant in two out of three PD 
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analyses (and marginal in the third), and significant in the meta-analysis. Moreover, two of the 
studies preregistered these exact predictions. However, in our experimental Studies 5 to 7, we 
found that using experimental manipulations to create a temporary increase in social comparisons 
did not significantly influence deontological or utilitarian responding. This finding suggests that 
the simple act of comparing oneself to others is not the systematic driver of how social 
comparison orientation is affecting decisions in moral dilemmas.  
Previous research has already found that people high in SCO tend to be competitive and 
envious (Bogaerts & Pandelaere, 2013; Lange et al., 2016), which, as our data demonstrate, 
produces a general disregard for harming others (i.e., SCO is connected to psychopath. As a 
result, high SCO individuals answer moral dilemmas similarly to people who score high on 
egoism, have a higher willingness to commit ethical violations, and have an aversion to 
experiencing personal inconveniences (e.g., Conway et al., 2020; Reynolds & Conway, 2018). In 
contrast, there is no evidence that asking people to compare themselves to others makes them 
more selfish or narcissistic. It is only when people typically compare themselves to others that 
leads to this pattern of decreased deontological thinking. We offer caution to this interpretation as 
these results are only correlational and do not speak to causation. Future research could employ a 
longitudinal design to test whether changes in chronically comparing oneself to others leads to 
changes in moral decision-making over time. 
Our findings make a number of novel contributions to the existing literature. First, our 
results clarify which of two competing hypotheses is correct: Are people high in SCO insecure 
self-monitors, or are they callous disregarders? Our findings indicate that the latter is true. 
Indeed, our pattern of results places people high in SCO in the same dubious moral company as 
egoists and psychopaths (e.g., Conway et al., 2020; Reynolds & Conway, 2018). Second, existing 
research has examined mostly how basic internal processes, like cognitive or affective processing  
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(e.g., Bartels, 2008; Greene, 2014; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Patil 
et al., 2020; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006), or social factors, such as self-presentation, affect 
decisions in moral dilemmas (e.g., Bostyn & Roets, 2017; Kundu & Cummins, 2013; Rom & 
Conway, 2018). Our research moves beyond these findings to examine how an unrelated 
personality trait—the tendency to relate to the world by means of comparison—impacts dilemma 
decisions. Such findings help bridge the role of social factors (e.g., comparison) with basic 
processing (e.g., reduced emotional concern). 
Conclusion 
Although early research described dilemma decisions as resulting from internal processes 
such as deliberation and emotion, social processing also impacts dilemma decisions. The current 
research indicates that social comparison orientation consistently reduces deontological 
decisions, whereas it has no direct effect on utilitarian decisions (although it may indirectly 
influence utilitarian responding via a complex array of processes that cancel out). Hence, people 
who frequently compare themselves with others find it more acceptable to cause harm 
(independent of whether doing so maximizes outcomes or not). Consistently comparing oneself 
to others to others seems to involve reduced emotional concern for others.   
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